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The annualized interest rate charged on payday loans can reach 1,950 percent, whereas similar rates charged 
by banks are typically less than 25 percent. Also, persons borrowing from payday lenders and paying the higher 
interest rates are disproportionately lower-income Blacks. This provides an incentive for Blacks seeking loans 
to turn to banks rather than payday lenders. This may be more likely to happen when there are Black-owned 
banks in communities with greater percentages of Blacks. Indeed, offices of such banks may substitute for 
payday loan stores, providing a greater opportunity for Blacks to avoid the higher interest rates associated with 
payday lenders. We hypothesize that to the extent Black-owned banks substitute for payday there is a greater 
opportunity for lower-income Blacks to substitute/switch firms and thereby seek lower-cost loans. We do find 
that there are significantly fewer payday loan stores in counties where there are more Black bank offices. 
 
KEYWORDS 




Banks and payday lenders are well-known categories of financial firms that provide loans to their 
customers. Both types of firms, moreover, charge interest on the loans they provide to borrowers. But 
the similarity between these two institutional types effectively ends there because the interest rates 
charged differ widely. Indeed, the annualized rates charged on payday loans can reach 1,950 percent 
(Barth et al., 2016), whereas similar rates charged by banks are typically less than 25 percent.   
The higher interest rates per se that are charged by payday lenders are controversial. So high that 
several states and the District of Columbia have prohibited payday lenders from even opening stores 
within their borders (Barth et al., 2016). Adding to the controversy is the fact that persons borrowing 
money from payday lenders and paying much higher interest rates are disproportionately lower-
income Blacks. Indeed, important research by Stegman (2007) finds that lower-income Blacks are 
more than twice as likely than whites to have taken out a payday loan. 
The fact that persons borrowing money from payday lenders and paying higher interest rates are 
disproportionately lower-income Blacks provides an incentive for Blacks seeking loans to turn to banks 
rather than payday lenders. This may be more likely to happen when there are Black-owned banks per 
se located in communities that have higher percentages of Black residents. Indeed, where there are 
offices of such banks, Blacks may switch from payday loan stores to offices of Black-owned banks, 
thereby obtaining a greater opportunity to reduce, if not avoid, the higher interest rate charges 
associated with payday lenders. Based on the previous literature, we believe we are the first to 
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1 We use the terms “Black banks” and “Black bank offices” rather the “Black-owned banks” and Black-owned bank offices,” 
respectively, throughout the remaining sections of this study. We do so simply because this terminology is consistent with 
previous related literature (see, e.g., Baradaran, 2017). 
2 Interestingly, solely Black-owned banks flourished in the 1950s and 1960s; however, over the 2001-2018 period, the number 
of exclusively Black-owned financial institutions declined over 50%, leaving only 21 Black-owned banks in the United States. 
Although there are a moderate number of branch banks for each of these institutions, it also is noteworthy that they all are 
comparatively small, with none managing even $1 billion. 
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hypothesize that to the extent Black-owned banks and payday lenders both have offices or stores in 
the same counties, there is a greater opportunity for lower-income Blacks to substitute/switch firms 
and thereby seek lower-cost loans.  
A factor motivating such a substitution is that banks offer deposit advances to customers, which 
are typically structured as short-term loans but without a predetermined repayment date. This product 
is a potentially much less costly substitute for payday loans. Our exploratory investigation seeks to 
determine whether there is a substitution of Black-owned bank offices1 for payday loan stores while 
controlling for a variety of demographic and economic characteristics in geographical locations where 
both types of financial firms simultaneously operate.2 The inclusion of such controls better enables us 
to isolate the association between Black banks and payday stores. Importantly, we do find (consistent 
with the hypothesized substitution process described) that there are fewer payday loan stores in 
counties where there are more Black bank offices.   
An issue that immediately arises when focusing on Black-owned banks is exactly how to distinguish 
these institutions from other depository institutions. In this regard, Section 308 of FIRREA defines a 
“Black-owned bank” as a depository institution where "Black Americans" own 51 percent or more of 
the stock. In addition to institutions that meet the ownership test, institutions are “Black-owned 
banks” if a majority of the Board of Directors is Black and the community that the institution serves is 
predominantly Black. Institutions not already identified as Black-owned depository institutions can 
request such a designation by certifying that they meet the above criteria. 
In addition to examining whether there is a substitution of Black-owned bank offices for payday 
lending stores, we also test whether there is a substitution of non-Black-owned bank offices for 
payday lending stores. Lastly, we also investigate whether there is a substitution of non-Black-owned 
bank offices for Black-owned bank offices. 
The remainder of our exploratory study proceeds as follows. In section 2, a brief review of related 
literature is provided. This is followed by an overview of both the payday lending industry and the 
Black banking sector in which we emphasize two somewhat unique issues that arise when studying 
these types of financial firms. Section 3 presents and discusses our approach to empirically analyzing 
the relationship between the number of Black bank offices and the number of payday loan stores 
operating in the same geographical locations in the U.S. In Section 4, our empirical results are 
presented and discussed. Section 5 presents the estimation results for determining whether there is a 
substitution of non-Black-owned bank offices for payday lending stores as well as whether there is a 
substitution of non-Black offices for Black bank offices. Section 6 provides conclusions, limitations, 




The criteria for receiving a payday loan are evidence of both employment and a checking account. The 
maturity of payday loans is most often two weeks, which is intended to coincide with a common pay 
cycle and set so that a borrower can repay upon receipt of the next paycheck. At the time a loan is 
originated, the borrower writes a postdated personal check or electronic authorization to debit the 
borrower's checking account for the loan amount plus the lending fee to the payday lender. When the 
loan is due, the payday lender can deposit the personal check or initiate the electronic withdrawal.
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3 The codes are 522291 (consumer lending) and 522390 (other activities related to credit intermediation). Barth et al. (2015) 
follow Bhutta (2014) and therefore rely on the same two NAICS codes. 
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Numerous studies of payday lenders focus on the demographics of their customer base (Graves, 
2003; Stegman and Faris, 2003; Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009; Bhutta, 2014; Barth et al., 2015) and the 
effect of regulations on their locational decisions (Morgan and Strain, 2008; Zinman, 2010; Barth et al., 
2016; Bhutta et al., 2016). A general conclusion of these studies is that payday lenders tend to 
concentrate in low-income areas having a relatively high percentage of Black residents. Accordingly, 
in the present study, the percentage of the population that is Black is included as a control variable. 
Not surprisingly, it is found that states with more lenient regulations on payday lenders tend to have 
a higher concentration of such stores. We, therefore, include variables to control for the regulatory 
environment of the counties used in our analysis. 
A serious challenge that confronts one studying the payday lending industry is that there is 
currently no available dataset that identifies only licensed payday lenders throughout the country. 
Accordingly, some studies (Stegman and Faris, 2003; Burkey and Simkins, 2004; Johnson, 2005; Graves, 
2005; Xu, 2016) consider only a few states, a procedure that appears to facilitate identifying payday 
lenders more easily. In other cases, studies rely on two North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) codes to capture payday loan firms operating across the country. In addition to payday 
lenders, however, these codes include other types of lending firms. Specifically, the codes include 
firms primarily engaged in making unsecured cash loans to consumers and firms that facilitate credit 
intermediation, including check cashing services and money-order issuance services.3 Although 
researchers using the NAICS codes try to screen out non-payday loan firms, the resulting effort is 
problematic, and the firms identified generally overstate the total presence of payday stores (Barth et 
al., 2016). We, therefore, rely on data that were obtained directly from the appropriate state regulatory 
authorities, following Barth et al. (2016). Importantly, this dataset contains only payday loan stores, 
excluding firms that simply provide cash checking services. Another uniqueness of the dataset is it also 
contains information on the various restrictions that states imposed on payday lenders, which will be 
used in our empirical analysis.  
 
DATA AND MODEL 
 
Figure 1 shows the location of Black bank offices and payday loan stores throughout the U.S. The bank 
office data are collected from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the payday loan 
stores data rely upon the data used by Barth et al. (2016). Their unique dataset is obtained directly 
from the state regulatory authorities through a combination of phone requests, written requests, and 
FOIA requests. As illustrated, there are (1) states with both types of financial firms, (2) states with only 
one or the other type of firm, and (3) states with neither type of firm. Payday loan stores are located 
in 35 states, while Black bank offices are located in 22 states and Washington, D.C. Both types of firms 
are located in 15 states. Lastly, there are seven states with neither type of firm. The focus of our 
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4 We use the phrase “initial model” because, in Section 5, we perform additional tests that allow us to examine whether 
similar substitutions exist between payday loan stores and non-Black bank offices as well as between Black bank offices and 
non-Black bank offices. 





The initial model4 that is used for examining whether Black bank offices substitute for payday loan 
stores is, as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖14𝑖𝑖=2 + 𝜀𝜀1                                  (1) 
 
where Payday Stores is the number of payday loan stores per 10,000 population in each county, Black 
Bank Offices is the number of Black bank offices per 10,000 population in each county, Controls are 
the 13 control variables that are described in Table 1, ε is the stochastic error term, c denotes a county, 
and i denotes a control variable. If for Blacks, Black bank offices and payday loan stores are regarded 
as substitutes, we would expect that the coefficient on Black Bank Offices, β1, will be significantly 
negative. 

















Table 1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Black Percent Black Population 
U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Asian Percent Asian Population 
Hispanic Percent Hispanic Population 
Age<15 Percent Population under Age 15 
Age>65 Percent Population over Age 65 
HSD Percent Population Age 25 and Older with a High School Diploma or Higher 
Rural Pop Percent Population Residing in Rural Areas 
Female Pop Percent Population Female 
Payday Stores Number of Payday Lenders per 10,000 Population 
Barth, Hilliard, Jahera, and 
Sun (2016) 
 
Max Loan Dummy Variable Maximum Dollar Loan Amount 
14-day-APR Dummy Variable APR for a Fourteen-day $100 Loan 
Max OST Maximum Number of Outstanding Loans 
Max NRO Maximum Number of Rollovers or Renewals 
UR Unemployment Rate (Percent) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Black Bank 
Offices 
Number of Black-owned MDI Offices per 10,000 
Population 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
Note: All variables are for the year 2015. Also, we exclude the percent White population because all four categories total 100 
percent and our focus is on controlling for the different minority populations. Thus, the percent White population is captured 
by the constant term in the regressions that are estimated below. 
 
The summary statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2. As shown, there are far more 
payday loan stores than there are Black bank offices. It is also shown that in the counties located within 
the 15 states having both of these types of financial firms, the percentage of the minority population 
that is Black is the highest at 7.3 percent, followed by Hispanics at 5.7 percent, and Asians at 0.8 
percent, respectively. The other control variables exhibit substantial variation, as indicated by the 






















Table 2. Summary Statistics (N=1,457 Counties) 
Main Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payday Stores (# per 10,000) 1.01 1.12 0 6.68 
Black Bank Offices 
(# per 10,000) 0.002 0.03 0 1.15 
Blacks (%) 7.31 10.09 0 54.92 
Asians (%) 0.78 1.75 0 26.79 
Hispanics (%) 5.69 9.36 0 59.86 
Age<15 (%) 18.75 2.77 6.50 29.50 
Age>65 (%) 17.06 4.43 6.80 50.90 
HSD (%) 83.38 7.00 46.20 97.70 
UR (%) 5.85 1.97 2.00 24.50 
Rural Pop (%) 58.33 31.94 0.00 100 
Female Pop (%) 50.00 2.60 31.47 59.42 
Poverty (%) 17.44 6.57 3.30 44.90 
MHHI (Ln $) 10.68 0.25 9.87 11.72 
Max Loan (0,1) 0.38 0.49 0 1 
14-day-APR (0, 1) 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Max OST (#) 2.49 1.63 0 6 




The results from estimating the model in equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The most important 
result is that Black bank offices do indeed substitute for payday loan stores. The coefficient on the 
number of Black bank offices is negative and highly statistically significant. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of Black offices per 10,000 persons is associated with a decline of 0.06 per 
10,000 persons in the number of payday loan stores. The results also indicate that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between the number of payday lender stores and the percent of the 
population that is African American, whereas the relationships between the number of payday lender 
stores and the percent of the population that is either Asian or Hispanic are significantly negative. Also, 
the findings indicate that less restrictive regulations governing the operations of payday lenders, 
measured by 14-day-APR, Max OST, and Max NRO, are all positively and statistically associated with 
more such stores. Furthermore, the number of payday loan stores is found to be statistically negatively 
associated with higher percentages of the population that have high school degrees but significantly 
positively associated with higher unemployment rates. Lastly, fewer payday lenders are associated 
with a higher percentage population over age 65, a higher percentage of the population residing in 
rural areas, and a lower percentage population that is female. 
 




Table 3. Empirical Results 
Payday Stores Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. t-value p-value 
Intercept 2.263*** 0.904 2.81 0.005 
Black 0.007* 0.004 1.79 0.073 
Asian -0.067*** 0.015 -4.55 0.000 
Hispanic -0.030*** 0.004 -7.06 0.000 
Age<15 0.016 0.014 1.16 0.248 
Age>65 -0.016** 0.008 -2.08 0.038 
HSD -0.053*** 0.006 -9.01 0.000 
UR 0.045*** 0.016 2.77 0.006 
Rural Pop -0.009*** 0.001 -8.69 0.000 
Female Pop 0.061*** 0.013 4.85 0.000 
Max Loan -0.020 0.081 -0.24 0.807 
14-day-APR 0.247*** 0.076 3.24 0.001 
Max OST 0.117*** 0.026 4.59 0.000 
Max NRO 0.084*** 0.014 5.87 0.000 
Black Bank Offices -1.923*** 0.430 -4.48 0.000 
N = 1,457 counties Adjusted R2 = 0.30 F = 38.30 
Note: The dependent variable is Payday Stores, the number of payday lender stores per 10,000 population. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. The t-values and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Also, we exclude the percent White 
population because all four categories total 100 percent and our focus is on controlling for the different minority 
populations. Thus, the percent White population is captured by the constant term. 
 
ADDITIONAL TESTS  
 
As discussed, our empirical results are consistent with the perspective that payday lending stores and 
Black bank offices are substitutes. However, two additional issues merit further consideration. The 
first issue is whether the same substitution exists between payday lending stores and non-Black bank 
offices, whereas the second issue is whether there is a substitution effect between Black bank offices 
and non-Black bank offices. To examine these issues, we estimate two additional regression equations. 
Equation (2) addresses the first issue, whereas Equation (3) addresses the second. The control 
variables are the same in these two models as in Equation (1). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖14𝑖𝑖=2 + 𝜀𝜀2    (2) 
 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 +∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖10𝑖𝑖=2 + 𝜀𝜀3        (3)         
 
The empirical results from estimating Equation (2) are reported in Table 4. As may be seen, the 
coefficient of Non-Black Bank Offices enters with a negative sign but is not significantly different from 
zero. This indicates that payday lending stores and non-Black bank offices are neither substitutes nor 
complements. The results for the control variables are generally consistent with those reported in 
Table 3. 
 




Table 4. Empirical Results 
Payday Stores Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. t-value p-value 
Intercept 2.548*** 0.313 4.16 0.000 
Black 0.013*** 0.004 3.45 0.001 
Asian -0.070*** 0.012 -5.70 0.000 
Hispanic -0.017*** 0.003 -6.09 0.000 
Age<15 -0.018** 0.009 -2.07 0.039 
Age>65 -0.013** 0.006 -2.20 0.028 
HSD -0.051*** 0.004 -12.44 0.000 
UR 0.032** 0.013 2.40 0.017 
Rural Pop -0.008*** 0.001 -9.76 0.000 
Female Pop 0.065*** 0.010 6.64 0.000 
Max Loan -0.202*** 0.037 -5.44 0.000 
14-day-APR 0.328*** 0.036 9.15 0.000 
Max OST 0.054*** 0.014 3.81 0.000 
Max NRO 0.080*** 0.010 7.82 0.000 
Non-Black Bank Offices -0.001 0.007 -0.22 0.827 
N = 2,401 counties Adjusted R2 = 0.30 F = 60.37 
Note: The dependent variable is Payday Stores, the number of payday lender stores per 10,000 population. The t-
values and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
As far as whether Black bank offices and non-Black bank offices are substitutes or not, the results 
are reported in Table 5. For this estimation, the results indicate there is no significant relationship 
between the two variables. Indeed, only two of the explanatory variables are statistically significant, 





















Table 5. Empirical Results 
Black Bank Offices Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.0472 0.0294 -1.61 0.108 
Black 0.0005* 0.0003 1.94 0.052 
Asian 0.0000 0.0001 0.33 0.739 
Hispanic 0.0002 0.0001 1.62 0.106 
Age<15 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.79 0.430 
Age>65 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.82 0.412 
HSD 0.0002 0.0002 1.47 0.141 
UR 0.0002 0.0003 0.63 0.528 
Rural Pop 0.0000 0.0000 0.57 0.569 
Female Pop 0.0005** 0.0002 2.21 0.027 
Non-Black Bank Offices -0.0000 0.0001 -0.28 0.778 
N = 3,046 counties Adjusted R2 = 0.03 F = 3.38 
Note: The dependent variable is Black Bank Offices, the number of Black bank offices per 10,000 population. The t-
values and p-values are based on robust standard errors. Symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 




Some consider payday lenders to be controversial financial firms. Aside from a degree of preference 
for these types of firms over traditional banks that may exist on the part of certain minorities 
(Baradaran, 2017), the controversy is largely due to the extraordinarily higher interest rates payday 
lenders charge on loans to their customers. Adding to this controversy is the fact that they are found 
to operate in locations with relatively high percentages of Blacks and tend to cater to low-income 
Blacks, as our empirical results indicate. In this exploratory study, we investigate empirically whether, 
in those locations where both payday loan stores and Black bank offices operate, there is evidence of 
a substitution effect. That is, Blacks can substitute Black banks for payday lenders because they would 
be in a more favorable position to benefit by obtaining lower-cost loans. Specifically, we analyze 
whether there is a significantly negative relationship between the numbers of payday loan stores and 
Black bank offices in counties in states where both types of firms operate simultaneously. Our 
empirical estimation results indicate that there is indeed such a statistically significant negative 
relationship, which is consistent with the hypothesized substitution of Black bank offices for payday 
loan stores. 
In addition, we perform two additional tests to determine whether the same type of substitution 
exists between payday lending stores and non-Black bank offices and whether there is a substitution 
effect between Black bank offices and non-Black bank offices. In both of these cases, we find there is 
no such substitution effect. Indeed, there is therefore only evidence that such an effect exists between 
payday lending stores and Black bank offices. 
A limitation of our study is that we do not have access to individual loan data over time for both 
payday lenders and Black banks to be able to perform a panel data analysis. This prevents one from 
determining more definitively whether Blacks do switch from payday loan stores to Black bank offices 
in those counties where both offer their services as well as address potential endogeneity issues. To 
the extent possible, future research should pursue such an analysis. Despite this limitation, it is 
nevertheless pertinent to have found that there is a statistically inverse relationship between payday 




loan stores and Black bank offices in counties where there is a significantly positive association 
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